如何駕馭第七波的全球化——魏尚進對話傑弗裏·薩克斯
導語
當今最緊迫的問題基本上是全球性的。如果我們要確保長遠的未來，就需要采取一致的全球行動。
“當前，我們已經進入人類歷史上第七波的全球化🙋🏽♂️。全球化的治理需要改革，才能戰勝全球各種緊迫與嚴峻的挑戰。人類能否經受住這波挑戰，可以從以往六波全球化的經歷中獲得啟示。”這是國際著名經濟學家🐾、可持續發展問題研究專家傑弗裏·薩克斯（Jeffrey D. Sachs）教授在他最新力作《全球化時代🤛🏻📎：地理、技術與製度》（The Ages of Globalization: Geography, Technology, and Institutions）一書中表達的觀點。通過對世界歷史的思考和解讀♚，傑弗裏·薩克斯教授試圖闡明21世紀人類社會面臨的挑戰和機遇及我們可行的應對之道。
近日，《56hcy.cn金融評論》主編👇🏻👊🏽、哥倫比亞大學終身講席教授魏尚進與傑弗裏·薩克斯教授展開對話🐩，就“第七波全球化”下各國的競爭與合作展開深刻研討🦃。
薩克斯教授回顧了七次不同的全球性技術和製度變革浪潮🦑，從早期現代人類通過長距離遷移實現最初定居開始追溯，一路探討至當下對全球化的反思。在此過程中，他思考了地理、技術與製度的交互作用如何影響新石器時代的革命🐩；馬匹在帝國崛起中的作用；大型帝國在古典時代的擴張🫴🏻；從歐洲通往亞洲和美洲的海路發現後，全球帝國的崛起和工業時代的開啟。傑弗裏·薩克斯教授表示，這些過去的浪潮為我們當前所處的時代中正在發生的進程提供了新的視角——基於數字技術的全球化💍。他強調必須采取新的國際治理與合作方法⛹🏿，以防止沖突並實現與可持續發展相一致的經濟、社會和環境目標。
他認為，以前的每個時代都出現了新的治理形式，我們現在也亟需一種新的全球治理形式來克服當今世界的三大挑戰🂠：第一，由於新技術取代工人而導致的、日益嚴重的收入和財富的不平等⚒，即全球範圍內持續存在的極端貧困，以及富裕社會內部不平等的加劇；第二🧖♂️，人為導致的“違反地球邊界”的氣候變化，使生物多樣性喪失和汙染加劇👰🏻♀️；第三，全球戰爭的威脅以及因為戰爭可能造成的物種滅絕。
薩克斯教授通過對人類歷史的反思，幫助我們獲得迫切需要的理論來理解全球化時代的人類發展📰，同時也為我們的未來發展提供了重要指導。
S: Shangjin Wei（魏尚進）
J: Jeffrey Sachs（傑弗裏·薩克斯）
相比競爭🧑🏽🦱，世界更需要合作
S: Your book takes a very long view of the history of globalization. One of the things that I came across in your book, when I was reading it, was that, sometimes the history can be violent, people do terrible things to each other and technology sometimes exacerbates that. But at the same time, people can also collaborate. And technology can also help on that dimension as well. So, in terms of lessons from the history, what do you think are the productive ways for us to manage the current wave of globalization?
魏尚進🦴：《全球化時代：地理、技術與製度》一書從宏觀的角度審視了全球化的歷史。當我在閱讀這本書時領會到的一點是：有時歷史是暴力的，人們可以對彼此做可怕的事情👩🏻🦽，而科學技術可以變成暴力的助虐🤶🏽；但同時歷史上也不乏人們相互合作的事例，技術也可以幫助人們更好地合作🍲。您認為為了有效地應對第七波全球化浪潮中的挑戰，我們應該從前六次全球化浪潮中吸取哪些教訓？
J: As you say, each wave of globalization has tended to change geopolitics, because new technologies or new institutions give rise to power. And power typically gives rise to war, unfortunately, in history. Once a country becomes powerful, it seems that the urge for conquest becomes also very, very powerful. And we see that with Britain, for example, which has a great economic success, which turns into a global empire. And I see it with the United States after World War Two, when the US became really the world’s superpower. You can't really run the world by an army. It's not possible. It's not desirable. It's not economical. So, it doesn't really accomplish much, but there is a lot of arrogance of power. So, for me, the question is, can we gain perspective, especially can scholars, cultural figures, business people or people in their daily lives be more constructive so that we don't fall into the tendency of viewing others through power relations, but rather through cooperation.
傑弗裏·薩克斯：正如您所說，每一次全球化浪潮都有可能改變地緣政治，因為新技術或新製度產生了權力☔️，而權力通常會引發戰爭。不幸的是，歷史上一旦一個國家變得強大，其征服他國的沖動似乎也變得非常強烈🫢。例如，我們看到英國在獲得了巨大的經濟發展之後，搖身一變成為一個全球性的帝國🤲🏿。同樣的劇情也發生在第二次世界大戰結束後的美國🕰。但是純靠一支軍隊來管理世界是不可能、不可取🙎🏿♀️🦶🏻，也是不經濟的。這麽做不會達到什麽好結果，只會反映權力的傲慢。所以每當（全球）權力發生變化的時候🦡，我們都要警惕👯。我覺得我們要反思的是💁♂️，學者、文化名人、商界人士以及老百姓需要反思的是，能否多從如何合作的角度來看（國與國之間的）關系， 而不是什麽都從權力鬥爭的角度去思考。
The truth in history is that it has happened both ways. And after World War Two, one very bright development was the invention of the United Nations by Franklin Roosevelt. He was our greatest president. He really wanted to create an institutional framework for global peace. And so, his idea during World War Two was that there should be a United Nations, and with the five major powers, or the five permanent members of the security council of that new United Nations. Actually, if those countries would work together to solve the pandemic, to address climate change, or to address other issues, we would actually have the basis for solving a lot. But if we view these challenges as cooperative opportunities, there is so much that could be done together. If we view them as rivalries, there is so much danger to the current situation. So, I'm very uneasy about where we are today because the institutions of the UN are not that strong. The United States actually has stopped supporting them, even pulling out of the World Health Organization. The chances for misunderstandings are very great. And so, I think this is the time to emphasize the cooperative possibilities.
歷史上正反經驗教訓都有🥉。第二次世界大戰結束後👨👩👦👦，富蘭克林·羅斯福發起成立的聯合國♣︎，這是一個引人註目的發展成果。羅斯福是我們美國最偉大的總統，他確實想為世界和平建立一個製度框架🤟。所以，他在第二次世界大戰期間的想法是應該建立一個聯合國，由五個主要大國擔任五個常任理事國。實際上，如果這些國家能夠共同努力解決全球大流行病、氣候變化等問題，就可以做成很多事情。現在也應該有更多國家加入常任理事國。如果我們將人類遇到的挑戰視為合作的機會，就可以一起做很多事情🏃🏻♂️➡️；如果我們把它們看作是又一個競爭，就會給目前的局勢就帶來許多危險。我對我們今天的處境感到非常不安，因為聯合國的機製並不是那麽強大🤵🏿，實際上美國已經停止了對它的支持，也退出了世界衛生組織。這一切變化讓（國與國之間的）誤解的可能性增大。所以🛁，我認為現在應該是強調合作的時候了。
S: Jeff, in your book, you made the reference to Graham Allison’s book, which proposed this Thucydides Trap hypothesis. It claims that whenever there's a change of power leadership, or whenever two leading powers get close in size, the chance of a war is much higher than 50%. In your reading of history, do you find it a useful description about power transitions? A related question is whether the United Nations can help us avoid the Thucydides Trap if it does exist. In the previous six waves of globalization, we did not have the United Nations (to try to stop wars between countries). Now we do. But at the same time, the United Nations seems like bring peace only if major powers want it to work. I know you have another book on sustainable development. The human race is facing so many common challenges besides war and peace, including ecological challenges. What can we do so that the attention of the powerful nations can be directed towards solving common challenges rather than trying to finishing each other?
魏尚進：您在書中提到了格雷厄姆·艾利森關於“修昔底德陷阱”的假說，該假說聲稱每當權力發生變化時，或者每當兩個實力領先的國家在規模上接近時，爆發戰爭的可能性會遠遠超過50%🛎。首先🗞，根據您對於歷史的研究，您認為“修昔底德陷阱”的假說是對世界各國權力過渡的準確描述嗎？其次🚯，聯合國的存在是否可以幫助我們擺脫“修昔底德陷阱”？在前六次全球化浪潮中，還沒有出現聯合國（試圖阻止國家之間的戰爭）➙，而現在我們有了。不過聯合國好像只在大國希望它發揮作用時才發揮作用。除了戰爭與和平之外，人類還面臨著許多共同挑戰🔆，包括生態挑戰🛥。我們要怎麽做，才可以協力應對這些挑戰，讓大國的註意力被更多地引導到解決共同的挑戰🕵️♀️，而不是試圖毀滅彼此？
Yeah. So, one of the most dramatic statements of our reality was made by president John F. Kennedy in 1961 in his inaugural address. And he said when he became president, the world is very different now for mankind has the ability to end all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And what he meant was that on the one hand, we're so technologically sophisticated that if we choose, we could end poverty, which is something that could never have been dreamt of in human history before. Actually, China has ended its poverty now, after having so much poverty 50 years ago. But at the same time, a big difference of our age is we have nuclear weapons and we have so much capacity to destroy not only through the military means, but also through the environmental means. So, we are living in a paradoxical age —great technological possibility to achieve good things, and tremendous risks of disaster.
傑弗裏·薩克斯🤾♂️：是的。約翰·F.肯尼迪總統在1961年的就職演說中就我們的現實做出了最具戲劇性的聲明🧑🏻🦽。他說🔸，當他成為總統時，世界與過往已經大不相同🐿，一方面人類有能力終結各種形式的貧困，但另一方面人類也有自我摧毀的能力。他的意思是🦛，一方面我們的技術如此先進，以至於如果我們願意我們就可以結束貧困👨🏼🦰，這是人類歷史上從未實現過的夢想😧。實際上，中國在經歷了五十年前的嚴重貧困之後，已經實現脫貧。但同時，我們時代的一個很大不同是我們擁有核武器🚂，其強大的破壞力不僅僅體現在軍事上，也體現在環境上。所以我們生活在一個矛盾的時代——偉大的技術能實現美好的東西，也能帶來巨大的災難風險。
And my reading of the last 70 years since 1950 is that we can be close to disaster many times during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. That was an ideological competition, a competition of systems, and a competition of politics. But it also led to a nuclear arms race. And on several occasions, it led to a confrontation that could easily have become a nuclear war. In fact, there's one famous moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when it was only a vote of two to one within a Soviet submarine not to launch a nuclear attack on the United States, which would have led to a global war.
我對於20世紀50年代以來大約70年的解釋是：在美蘇冷戰期間，我們許多次接近災難的邊緣。這是一個意識形態、製度和政治上的競爭，但它也是一場核軍備競賽⚆。有好幾次👧🏿，核戰爭差點發生。1962年“古巴導彈危機”中有一個著名的時刻🩸，當時一艘蘇聯潛艇差一點就對美國發動核攻擊🧙🏽♀️，這原本會導致一場世界大戰。
And my reading of the last 70 years since 1950 is that we can be close to disaster many times during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. That was an ideological competition, a competition of systems, and a competition of politics. But it also led to a nuclear arms race. And on several occasions, it led to a confrontation that could easily have become a nuclear war. In fact, there's one famous moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when it was only a vote of two to one within a Soviet submarine not to launch a nuclear attack on the United States, which would have led to a global war.
我對於二十世紀50年代以來大約70年的解釋是：在美蘇冷戰期間，我們許多次接近災難的邊緣。這是一個意識形態、製度和政治上的競爭，但它也是一場核軍備競賽。有好幾次，核戰爭差點發生。1962年“古巴導彈危機”中有一個著名的時刻，當時一艘蘇聯潛艇差一點就對美國發動核攻擊，這原本會導致一場世界大戰。
There were so many wars in history and very bloody ones. But they weren't able to destroy everything because they didn't have nuclear weapons. Now we're capable of destroying everything in a matter of hours. And gradually look at the destruction that can come from environmental change and look at how fast the crisis can arise from a new disease. So, all of these are reasons why we should be cooperating.
歷史上有這麽多血腥的戰爭，但因為沒有核武器😽，它們不曾摧毀一切。而今我們卻有能力在短短數小時內讓一切化為灰燼。我們也能慢慢察覺到環境變化帶來的破壞🚴🏿，見證新型疾病轉化為危機的速度有多快⏮。這些都解釋了我們為什麽應該選擇合作🧑🧒🧒🦍。
公共政策的實現需要社會凝聚力
S: You are also a deep thinker about public health and epidemiological topics. Countries like Brazil, which until last year was richer than China in terms of capita GDP, can be so ineffective in controlling the pandemic. Why is that?
魏尚進👨🦼➡️：您也是公共衛生和流行病問題的深刻思考者。能否請您談一下🖖，為何類似巴西這樣去年人均GDP超過中國的國家🎥，在控製新冠肺炎疫情方面竟然如此不力，這是為什麽呢？
J: What we're observing actually is a mix of politics and social cohesion. In China, when the Wuhan outbreak occurred, the government acted very decisively, even during the Chinese New Year to lock down the country, at a time when millions and millions of people are in travel. And it was very inconvenient. But it was a necessary move. It was a shocking move. We've never seen it before in history. But the Chinese leadership took a very decisive action. The public abided by the instructions, the applications like Alibaba and other online applications were quickly brought to use. So the digital technologies could be used. Thousands of public health teams were engaged to test people and to isolate people who were infected. All the steps that were taken contributed to suppressing the epidemic. It was really a remarkable achievement because it was out of control at the beginning. But within about seven weeks, it was brought back under control.
傑弗裏·薩克斯💒💪：我們實際上觀察到的是一種政治因素和社會凝聚力交織的影響。在中國🤌🏿，當疫情在武漢爆發時，政府采取了非常果斷的“封城”行動，盡管是在中國新年期間💂，數以百萬的人仍在途中。這雖然帶來極大地不便，但卻是必要的行動。這是一個史無前例✊、令人震驚的行動🤶🏼。中國領導層采取了非常果斷的行動🍢，公眾也遵守政府的指示🪨。阿裏巴巴集團和其他在線應用程序迅速投入使用。成千上萬的公共衛生團隊參與了對公眾的核酸檢測和隔離。所有舉措都有助於抑製疫情。這真的是一個了不起的成就。因為疫情雖在初期一度失控，但在大約7周時間內就被控製住了。
Other countries and regions in the Asia-Pacific knew this was urgent. So, one saw in many places a quite sharp response. Republic of Korea was another example where the response was very good. And in Taiwan and Hong Kong region, both have strong public health response. Vietnam did an amazing job, even at very low income. But what I would say in all of these cases is that there was a social responsibility. People wore face masks. They understood this was very dangerous. Government acted decisively at the top and good public health measures were implemented and where possible, the digital technologies were used.
其他亞太國家和地區也清楚抗擊新冠肺炎疫情的緊迫性，所以我們看到在許多地方有相當迅速的反應💂🏻💃🏼。韓國的反應也是另外一個非常好的例子👨🏻🦽➡️。在中國臺灣和中國香港地區也都有快速的公共衛生響應。盡管越南是一個低收入國家🤏🏻，抗擊疫情也表現得很好。但我想說的是，所有這些情況之下，都包含著一種社會責任👨🎨。人們佩戴口罩，知道疫情的危險性。政府高層果斷地采取了行動，執行了良好的公共衛生措施，並在可能的情況下采用了數字技術⛹🏻。
In my country, in the United States and another country which we're speaking about, in Brazil, society is very divided. So, there's a lot of distrust. And instead of having public health control, we had a major cultural and social and political battle. Also people were very divided economically, racially and ideologically. So, in the United States and in Brazil, there was never an attempt made by the national government, neither by president Trump nor by president Bolsonaro of Brazil for a full national-scale policy. In fact, Trump opposed face masks for a long time and wouldn't wear one. On his own, it signaled to his supporters don't wear face masks and governors of states of Trump's party rejected control measures.
在美國和巴西，社會分裂比較嚴重，信任機製薄弱。兩國都沒有在關鍵時刻進行公共衛生方面的控製，取而代之的是一場重大的文化🤹🏿♀️、社會和政治爭鬥；在經濟、種族問題和意識形態上的分裂也十分嚴重🦸🏿♂️。所以在美國和巴西都未曾有國家政府層面的政策嘗試，無論是來自美國總統特朗普還是巴西總統博索納羅🐨。事實上👍，特朗普有很長一段時間反對佩戴口罩1️⃣，自己也不戴口罩。他的做法就是在示意他的支持者不要戴口罩𓀑。支持特朗普所在的共和黨的州長們也拒絕采取控製疫情的措施。
So, in the end, the United States failed to control this pandemic. And while China has had a few thousand deaths, the United States has had more than 150,000 deaths, even though we're less than 1/4 the population of China. And China has a few cases now each day. But in the United States, we have 60, 000 new cases each day. So, I blame our culture. I blame our politicians. I blame our failure of public response. And basically, I blame our inequality and inability to behave as a society with decency, even with mutual respect, because wearing a face mask is also a respect for other people. I think in Asia, there's a lot of respect that you don't want to infect other people.
所以美國最終未能控製住這場大流行👨🏽⚖️。當中國只有幾千人死亡，美國有超過15萬人死亡🌅，盡管我們的人口只有不到中國人口的四分之一，並且現在的中國每天新增病例非常少🤷♀️。在美國我們每天有大約6萬個新增病例，所以我將應對不力歸咎於我們的文化🪵🛕、我們的政客和我們公共響應的失敗。在根本上，我將其歸咎於我們的不平等和不能像一個良好社會那樣的作為。我們甚至沒有相互尊重，因為戴口罩也是對其他人的尊重。在亞洲人們非常尊重戴口罩防止感染他人的行為😄。
全球化沒有失敗
S: Another question on pandemic has to do with its relationship with globalization. In particular, with Covid-19 pandemic, there's a greater need for international cooperation in terms of delivery of various equipment, protective gears, in terms of exchange of information, and in terms of pulling resources, developing vaccines and cures. At the same time, we hear a lot of rhetoric about decoupling, deglobalization, or moving production away from all offshore areas to home. Given the so much news about decoupling and deglobalization, do you think whether this is a trend, or it is only a temporary phenomenon? Can we ever get back to closer cooperation after that?
魏尚進👨👦：另一個關於流行病的問題是它與全球化的關系。在應對新冠肺炎疫情之時📵，國與國之間非常需要在提供各種設備和防護用品、信息交流、資源整合、疫苗和治療藥物開發等方面進行合作。但同時我們聽到了很多關於脫鉤、去全球化、將生產從所有的離岸地區轉移到國內的噪聲9️⃣。鑒於如此多的關於脫鉤和去全球化的新聞👨🦲，您覺得這是否是一種趨勢，是真正的主導思想，還只是暫時的現象？在這之後我們還能回到更緊密的合作狀況嗎？
J: First, we can ask, what should we desire? And my feeling is that the gains from globalization properly managed are enormous. So, the benefits of globally open world where we are in trade, in tourism, with exchange of students, and in cultural, sports, scientific exchange or entertainment exchange is huge. And I think that it would be a tragedy to lose much of that which is feasible because we have had reversals of globalization in the past. There are deep positive reasons for global interconnectedness, but they can be reversed by policy or by war or by other kinds of disasters and the most famous of these relates to the great depression when countries chose to stop trading with each other and to impose a very, very high tariff starting with the United States in the early 1930s and that led to a collapse of globalization, which was devastating because that in turn led to war. And when globalization fails, distrust among countries rises.
傑弗裏·薩克斯：首先，試問我們在渴望什麽？我認為我們從管理良好的全球化獲得的收益是巨大的🧑🌾。在一個開放的世界中🧑🧒🧒，我們從貿易👜、旅遊、學生交換💯，從文化☎、體育、科學和娛樂交流中的獲益是巨大的👩🔧。我認為失去這些原本可以獲得的收益將是一個悲劇。過去發生過的全球化逆轉給了我們這樣的教訓。全球互聯互通有深刻且積極的意義，但它可以被政策、戰爭或其他類型的災難所逆轉。其中最著名的是在大蕭條時期，國家間選擇停止相互貿易🧕🏽，並在20世紀30年代初施加了一個非常高的、始於美國的關稅，導致了全球化的崩潰🧑🏼🔬。這是毀滅性的，因為這反過來會導致戰爭——當全球化失敗，國家之間的不信任感就會上升。
So, from the point of view of what we should do, we should not abandon globalization. We should understand that interconnectedness has dangerous, such as the rapid spread of a virus, but we should cooperate to control the bad side of globalization and not lose the beneficial side of globalization. In fact, there will be, I think some of those measures of creating more domestic industry, there will be more competition among key supply chains. There will not be the same positive view of globalization for some years to come. But if we're lucky, we won't have a collapse. We will just have a moderation or some adjustment. A lot depends on, unfortunately, US politics.
所以就我們應該做什麽而言，答案是不應該放棄全球化。我們應該理解互聯互通有危險，比如病毒的快速傳播；但我們應該通過合作來管控全球化不好的一面🏃♀️⬜️，而不要放棄全球化有益的一面🫸🏻。有一些舉措會保護國內的（關鍵）產業，也會帶來更多關鍵供應鏈之間的競爭。在未來幾年內，人們不再對全球化有同過去一樣的完全積極的看法，但如果我們幸運的話🧘🏼♂️，全球化體系不會瓦解🐤，而只會有一個適度的調整🧑🏼🏭。不幸的是🍄，（具體發展的格局）很大程度上取決於美國的政治。
I think it's vital if and when we have a new president, China and the US may deepen the discussions. There’ll be even much deeper institutional cooperation and exchanges on many issues — energy, environment, public health, economics, finance, technology, etc. Because I think that having a deep relationship where you really negotiate these issues and work them out in a lot of professional detail would stabilize this situation and enable globalization to continue on all its positive dimensions.
如果我們換了一位新總統，中國和美國將（可以）討論更深層次的、製度上的合作，在許多問題上進行交流🧳：能源🌩、環境、公共衛生🪡、經濟🚵、金融、技術等。因為我認為有了深厚的關系👩🏽🦱，雙方才能真正談判這些問題🫸，並在很多專業細節上解決它們👴🏼。這樣才能穩定這種局面，使全球化積極地進行下去🚝。
S: One claim by some in the US is that WTO has failed in multiple fronts, including in converting China to be one that follows international trading rules, and therefore the United States has not been benefiting from trade. I wonder whether you can share your analysis of this view? How can the WTO reform itself and help to revive the world trade, and help the world economy to recover soon from the Covid recession?
魏尚進：在美國有一種說法認為世貿組織已經在多個方面（包括敦促中國遵循國際貿易體系等）失敗了，因此美國一直吃虧，也並沒有從貿易中受益🪮。請問您是否贊同這個觀點？世貿組織體系如何可以通過改革再次幫助振興世界貿易🙏🦞，幫助世界經濟從疫情帶來的經濟蕭條中盡快復蘇🧑🧑🧒🧒？
J: Yeah, it's a very interesting and intricate question. First, WTO did not fail, and the globalization of trade did not fail. It's been a very positive outcome overall. It has been key for China's development. And I think it has been beneficial for the United States and for other parts of the world as well. And the rules of the game of WTO have been very helpful for that.
傑弗裏·薩克斯：是的⛰🧺，這是一個非常有趣而復雜的問題。首先，世貿組織並沒有失敗，貿易全球化也沒有失敗。總體而言，這是一個非常積極的結果👳🏻♂️，它一直是中國發展的關鍵🚈。我認為這對美國和世界其他地區也是有益的🍆。世貿組織的遊戲規則對各國發展都是非常有幫助的。
Now, there are several issues that have arisen that we should be clear about. One is that US-China trade probably worsened the income distribution in the United States because some industrial workers lost their jobs. China was very competitive in many industrial sectors, especially in manufacturing sectors. And it's quite possible that the international trade raised the US income, but also worsened the US income distribution. But that's not a fault of China or fault of WTO because when we teach international trade, what we teach is that international trade enables overall rise of income, but it can shift the distribution. So, in order to ensure that everybody benefits, there needs to be redistributive policies together with trade in the United States. We don't have those kinds of redistributive policies. So, losers lose, winners win, and losers become unhappy and vote for opponents of trade. But what we should have is more redistribution inside the United States.
現在有幾個問題我們應該明確🍾。一個是中美貿易很有可能確實惡化了美國的收入分配體系，使一些美國的產業工人失去了工作。因為中國在很多產業部門都非常有競爭力，特別是製造業部門。國際貿易提高了美國的總體收入，同時也影響了美國的收入分配。但這不是中國的錯🚣🏻♂️，也不是世貿組織的錯🧑🦰，因為當我們講授國際貿易時🙅🏿♀️，我們講的是國際貿易使收入整體上升，但它可以改變分配。所以為了確保每個人都能受益，美國需要有再分配政策配合貿易，而我們沒有這種再分配的政策🚐。所以輸家輸了💁♂️，贏家贏了。輸家變得不高興🚫✵，投票給貿易的反對者🧑🏿⚕️。但我們應該做的是在美國內部進行更多的再分配👨🏽🦲。
And China's answer to the US is, look, you have benefited with the larger economy, and we have benefited with the larger economy. If some people have been left behind, that is what our national policies should help to address with retraining, reskilling, new jobs, new industries development and so forth. This is why in social democratic countries, for example, in Germany or in Northern European countries like Sweden and Denmark, there isn't a backlash. The same way as there is in the US, because there's a lot of redistribution of income, a lot more job training and a lot more sharing of the benefits. So, the WTO didn't fail, but American politics failed to make sure that the benefits were shared adequately.
中國對美國的回應是，既然美國和中國都已經從（雙邊貿易中）受益💔，如果有些人被落下了，那需要本國政府采取政策通過再培訓、新技能培養🧑🏿🦲，提供新的就業機會👩🏻💼，發展新的產業等來幫助解決問題🚱。這就是為什麽在社會民主國家，如德國或瑞典和丹麥等北歐國家🚫👳🏿，沒有出現類似美國強烈的全球化逆潮👩🏿🔧，因為它們有很多的收入再分配措施🐳、更多的工作培訓🤱🏽、更多的利益分享。所以，世貿組織沒有失敗，但美國政治沒有確保充分的利益共享。
Then I think there's a second very important dimension that we're facing right now. China has engaged in very extensive industrial policies to promote new industries and the “Made in China 2025” policies identify 10 priority areas, such as advanced semi-conductors, advanced transport, a precision agriculture, advanced medicine and so forth. This is a very smart policy, in my view, because China strategically has identified priority technologies and has said we're going to drive technological advancement in those areas. Now the United States also has industrial policies, but we don't usually think of them that way. So, if the US advance the Internet or develops a genome sequencing, that's with the government. And then it's turned over to the private sector, but we don't count that as industrial policy.
我認為，我們現在還正面臨著第二個非常重要的方面，就是中國已經廣泛地製定了頗有遠見的產業政策來促進新興產業發展。“中國製造2025”政策確定了十個優先發展的領域🧑🏻🎨🤽♂️，比如先進半導體、先進運輸💪、精準農業💆🏿♂️👰♂️、先進醫學等。在我看來這是一個非常明智的政策，因為中國在戰略上已經確定了優先領域，並表示將在這些領域推動技術進步🌠。現在美國也有產業政策，但我們通常不會像中國一樣去考慮這些問題。所以如果美國推進互聯網發展或開發基因組測序🕵🏿♀️，這些都是政府行為，然後移交到私營部門，但美國不把它稱為產業政策。
So, it's partly an ideological view that what China does is industrial policy and unfair and what we do is scientific progress and only fair. So, there's an issue of semantics. But there's another substantive issue, in my opinion, which is that because we are in a technological dynamic period.
因此，（美國）認為中國所做的產業政策是不公平的，而（自認為）美國所做的才是代表科學進步和公平的，在一定程度上是一種意識形態的觀點。這裏其實只是一個表達的問題🚣🏼♂️。但在我看來還有一個實質性問題是，我們處於一個技術動態發展的階段。
It's a good idea to have industrial policies where government helps to promote be underlying science and early stage technological advancement, whether it's in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, and so forth, or environmental conservation. So, for this reason, I'm in favor of industrial policy.
我認為製定產業政策是一個好主意，政府幫助促進基礎科學和早期階段的技術進步👐🏿，不管是在可再生能源領域🕕，還是在人工智能、先進機器人技術等領域↙️🔊，抑或是在環境保護領域等。因此，出於這個原因🏇🏻，我贊成產業政策。
Now WTO does not have good rules about this. There isn't clarity about how to interact. So the United States points its finger to China and says that's unfair. This should be done not through a trade war or through a technology war. It should be done through negotiations and it should be done at least with three (or) even more partners. But China is one. The European Union is another. The United States is the third. Of course, there are many other countries that say we're part of this too, Republic of Korea, Japan, and so on. So, finding the right venue for a serious negotiation over how to keep industrial policy for its beneficial side and not for its beggar-thy-neighbor, damaging side when it damages others. Industrial policies are important and their beneficial, I think for everybody, not just for China. The United States and Europe should have industrial policies. But we should negotiate a framework for them that makes them more transparent and focuses on the beneficial side of promoting technological advance, not on damaging the other country.
現在世貿組織對此沒有很好的規定🧑🏽🚀💇🏽♀️，沒有明確如何互動。所以美國把矛頭指向中國👇🏿😵💫，說這是不公平的。這不應該通過貿易摩擦或技術戰來完成，而應該通過談判來完成，並至少應該與三個甚至更多的夥伴一起來完成⛳️。中國是其中一方，歐盟是另一方，美國是第三方🦴。當然，還有很多其他國家表示它們也是其中的一部分，比如韓國和日本。所以找到合適的地點進行認真的談判，討論如何保持產業政策有利的一面📋，而不是以鄰為壑🪤、有損相互利益的方面。產業政策不但重要而且對每個國家都是有益的。美國和歐洲都應該有產業政策🔏，但我們應該為此談判一個框架，使其更為透明📽🂠，並側重於促進有益的技術進步，而不是損害其他國家🔽。
遏製數字軍備競賽
S: Let me add three comments to what you said. So, number one, the World Trade Organization was set up under the leadership of the United States. Its rules reflect much of what US thinks, and importantly China has played no role in writing the WTO rules since China at the time was not a member economy.
魏尚進😗：請允許我補充三個評論。第一，世界貿易組織是在美國的領導下成立的🧙♂️，其規則生效很大程度上體現的是美國的想法📠🥈。中國實際上沒有參與其規則製定，因為中國不是 WTO 創始成員國。
Secondly, the concept of industrial policy was not invented by China. In fact, it was invented by United States — Alexander Hamilton, the first US Secretary of Treasury, a founding father of the nation and a graduate of Columbia university, or its predecessor, the King's College. So, certainly the idea of industrial policy was not foreign to US.
第二，產業政策的概念不是中國發明的🧑🏼⚕️，事實上它是美國的第一任財政部長🚶🏻♀️、開國元勛👩🏻🍼，畢業於哥倫比亞大學的前身國王學院的亞歷山大·漢密爾頓發明的。所以對美國而言，產業政策並不陌生🚶🏻➡️😉。
But there are different views. Some say US has never adopted industrial policy. It's a bad idea from Hamilton. Others say “No, we don't like the phrase of industrial policy, but we practice it all the time throughout our history from our science, technology program, NIH, NSF, Department Defense budget, or Department Energy budget. We do a lot of things those are functionally the same as industrial policy, but we hate that term for some reason”. I'm curious about your view on this.
但不同的美國人有不同的觀點。有些人說美國從來沒有采取過產業政策🙅👩👩👦，這是一個漢密爾頓想出來的餿主意。也有些人說，雖然我們不喜歡“產業政策”這個詞，但實際上我們在歷史上一直在施行它——從政府對科學技術項目的支持包括美國國立衛生研究院（NIH）🏝、美國國家科學基金會（NSF）到國防部預算和能源部預算，我們做了很多實質上和產業政策等同的事情，但我們出於某些原因討厭這個詞2️⃣。所以我很好奇您對這兩個說法有什麽看法？
The 3rd comment is the relationship between WTO and industrial policy. A key principle of WTO is non-discrimination between domestic firms and foreign firms. This means industrial policy in principle can be structured in such a way that's consistent with non-discrimination, and therefore compatible with WTO rules, right?
第三是🔩，世貿組織和產業政策之間的關系。世貿組織的一個關鍵原則是對國內外企業一視同仁，不以企業的國別為基礎進行歧視𓀊。至少從邏輯上說產業政策可以做到符合非歧視原則，與WTO規則一致🏄🏻♂️♑️。您是否同意？
To the extent, the industrial policy is meant to address some “externality” in technological advancement in which maybe private sector on their own may not put in enough resources. One could imagine a case in which international collaboration, collectively supporting certain industry, is a socially beneficial policy, and vaccine development during the pandemics an example of this. If we think the private sector on its own might not put in enough resources, national governments can step in and step up the effort. It will be even more efficient for the world as whole to do it, if there's some resource pooling arrangements. Do you think we should have a global version of the industrial policy in some areas that could advance the interest of humankind?
有些經濟活動或技術發展因為存在“外部性”👱🏻♂️，私營部門自身可能不會投入足夠的資源。這時產業政策可能有用武之地🐯。我們甚至可以想象這樣一種情況𓀚，實施跨國性的產業政策👰🏼♀️，通過國際合作共同支持某些產業，如新冠肺炎疫情背景下的疫苗開發🛣，僅靠私營部門可能不會投入足夠的資源⚇，但政府可以介入並加緊努力。如果有一個國際性的產業政策，進行一些資源共享🧗🏿，全世界作為一個整體會更有效率。您認為我們是否應該在某些領域製定一個促進人類利益的全球版本的產業政策🎳🚵🏼♂️？
J: These are really deep and great observations that you're making. Let me go back to Alexander Hamilton for one moment. Industrial policy has two parts, I think in history. One is catching up. And the other is general advancement.
傑弗裏·薩克斯🎄：您的觀察很好，非常深刻！讓我先回到亞歷山大·漢密爾頓有關產業政策的研究。我認為在歷史上，產業政策有兩類目標：一個是迎頭趕上其他國家；另一個是一般性的發展進步🥍。
So, when Alexander Hamilton was writing about industrial policy, he was aware that England was technologically ahead of the United States. And as the first the Treasury Secretary of the United States, he was concerned, how can we catch up as a new industrializing economy, which United States was at the time. So he helped to give ideas about that catching up. And there were also good business people taking whatever technology they could find from England and bringing it over to the United States and trying to implement the same measures in the US. So, that's part of the catching up.
所以當亞歷山大·漢密爾頓在寫作時，他意識到英國在技術上領先於美國。作為美國的第一任財政部長，他非常重視作為新型工業化經濟體的美國如何趕上英國👨🏿🎤。所以從這個意義上講，是他幫助給出了關於追趕的想法。我們也有企業家把從英國找到的技術都帶到美國，並試圖在美國復製（英國的）技術。所以，這是追趕的一部分。
Then there's the more general question of industrial policy for advancement of knowledge and surely all major powers have industrial policies, first for the military. This is where so much industrial policy in history has taken place. But the United States was very clever after World War Two. Again, we really had a great president Franklin Roosevelt, who in 1944, said to his science advisor, “What do we do with all of these military technologies that we've advanced during World War Two, radar, semi-conductors, computation, and so on. How do we make this available for the civilian economy? This was a great idea because Roosevelt did not want just a military superpower. He wanted a good society. So, the outcome of that was a famous book in American economic thinking or national strategy called “Science, the Endless Frontier”, written in 1945 by Vannevar Bush, who was Franklin Roosevelt’s science advisor. And it said, let us champion science-based economic development. And out of that came the institutions you mentioned the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and very large spending by the US government on technological advancement.
然後更普遍的問題是支持知識進步的產業政策。當然所有的主要大國都有產業政策🚂，首先是用在軍事上——這是歷史上這麽多產業政策的起點。但美國在第二次世界大戰結束後非常聰明。再說一次🦻🏼，我們真的曾有一個偉大的總統富蘭克林·羅斯福🤜。他在1944年對他的科學顧問說，我們該怎麽用好在第二次世界大戰期間發展起來的所有軍事技術——雷達🧛🏿♀️、半導體、計算機等🧎🏻♀️➡️；如何為民用經濟提供這些技術。這是一個偉大的想法，因為羅斯福不希望美國只是一個軍事超級大國👰🏻，他想要營造一個良好的社會🆘。其成果是一本有關美國經濟思想或國家戰略的著作《科學🕺🏼：無盡的前沿》，由富蘭克林的科學顧問萬尼瓦爾·布什作於1945年。書中提到，讓我們捍衛以科學為基礎的經濟發展🐕🦺。由此，您之前提到的美國國家科學基金會、美國國立衛生研究院等機構成立，美國政府在技術進步方面進行巨大投入。
There was a huge payoff from this, because this is where the Internet eventually arose from. This is where the semi-conductor industry eventually arose from. This is where the “Moon Shot” gave us space technology, satellite technology, GPS, a huge advance in Micro-electronics and so many other areas. So, that's all sophisticated industrial policy, but just not called that. And the United States had huge, huge benefits that I think our global benefits.
這些都給我們帶來了巨大的回報，因為這是互聯網和半導體行業最終出現的起點，是登月發射技術的前身🕖，帶給了我們空間技術、衛星技術、全球定位系統，以及在微電子和許多其他領域的巨大進步。這些都是復雜的產業政策，只是沒有被這樣稱呼。美國獲得了巨大的利益，我認為這些還造福了全球。
So, your idea, for example, of putting the principles of this non-discrimination or global pooling is a great starting point. For example, to decarbonize the world energy system as fast as possible or to bring Internet access to everybody to end poverty. These are global public goods that we should pursue together. Then there will also necessarily be competition. We should restrain the digital arms race in weaponry just like we have tried to do with nuclear arms. We don't want arms race in cyber warfare. That would be awful and could be very disruptive. But we do want some competition in other areas — who's going to produce the best electric vehicles. We should have some rules of the game, some rules of the road so that one can have industrial policies but still have global competition, have trade and not have the massive distortions that are going to lead to a loss of wellbeing for all of us. And so, I think you should write down these principles that you started too. And this becomes the basis for our new multilateral negotiations.
實際上您提出的無歧視原則或全球資源整合是一個很好的起點。例如🧚♂️🫂，加快世界能源系統的碳減排，或使英特網觸及每一個人以幫助結束貧困🧑⚖️，這些是我們應該共同追求的全球公共產品🏃🏻➡️。當然國與國之間也必然會有競爭。但我們應該遏製數字軍備競賽，就像我們在核武器方面所做的那樣💂🏽。我們不想要太空軍備競賽，否則這將是可怕的並非常具有破壞性的。同時我們確實希望在其他領域有一些競爭，如競爭誰能生產出更好的電動汽車。我們應該有一些遊戲規則、一些道路規則📕，這樣我們就可以既有產業政策，也有全球競爭🆗、有國際貿易🦢，而不是以大規模的扭曲損害全球人類的福祉。所以您應該把您的想法寫下來，把這些原則寫下來，這可以成為國與國之間新的多邊談判的基礎🐽。
*本文僅代表訪談者個人觀點，翻譯：吳畏，編輯🌛：潘琦🙋🏿。